Joshua Lasley, a St. Louis County, Missouri, police officer, received disciplinary action related to conduct where Lasley “would have been involved in some secondary employment.” This required him to forfeit 24 hours of paid time of (PTO) for alleged misconduct related to secondary employment.
Under the St. Louis County Charter, all disciplinary actions are subject to an employee’s right of appeal to the Board of Police Commissioners, with the Board’s decisions being “final and conclusive.” Lasley exercised this right, but on June 10, 2022, he was informed that his appeal would be heard by a hearing officer rather than the full Board. Challenging this shift, Lasley fled a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, arguing that the Charter unambiguously required the Board itself, and not a subordinate officer, to adjudicate disciplinary appeals. The Board countered that its general authority to “promulgate rules and regulations” for police discipline under the Charter implicitly permitted it to delegate appeal hearings to hearing officers.
The trial court ruled for Lasley, issuing a permanent writ of prohibition that barred the Board from offloading its appeal-hearing duty. In its order, the Court emphasized the Charter’s “clear and unambiguous” language in Sections 4.270.7(3) and 4.280, which explicitly task the Board with “hearing and determining appeals” and grant officers a right to appeal “to the Board of Police Commissioners.” The Court found no textual basis for delegation, noting that while the Board’s rules allowed hearing officers to handle pre-hearing matters, the Charter reserved final adjudicative authority exclusively for the Board.
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Board advanced two primary arguments. First, it contended the trial court misread the Charter by failing to recognize its implied authority to delegate under its rulemaking powers. Second, it argued the case was moot because the Chief had rescinded Lasley’s PTO forfeiture, albeit while leaving the underlying misconduct finding in his personnel file.
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected both claims.
Addressing mootness first, the Court acknowledged that rescinding the PTO penalty altered the dispute’s contours but held that the case remained justiciable because the retained misconduct record could still harm Lasley’s career. As the Court noted, the unresolved violation in his Bureau of Professional Standards file could influence future disciplinary proceedings, leaving Lasley with a tangible stake in clearing his name through a proper appeal process.
The Court then turned to the delegation issue and found the Charter’s language to be unambiguous. Section
4.270.7(3) directs the Board to “hear and determine appeals,” while Section 4.280 guarantees officers a right to appeal “to the Board,” language the Court stressed was “mandatory, not permissive.” Crucially, the Charter contained no provision authorizing the Board to transfer this duty, nor did the Board’s own rules claim such power; its procedural code only permitted hearing officers to handle pre-hearing logistics and make non-binding recommendations. “It is well-established this Court may not engraft upon the statute provisions which do not appear in explicit words or by implication from other language in the statute.”
Lasley v. St. Louis Cnty., 2025 Mo. App. LEXIS 144* (Mo. Ct. App. 2025).